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Abstract
We found that a reliability model commonly used to
estimate Mean-Time-To-Data-Loss (MTTDL), while
suitable for modeling RAID 0 and RAID 5, fails to ac-
curately model systems having a fault-tolerance greater
than 1. Therefore, to model the reliability of RAID 6,
Triple-Replication, or k-of-n systems requires an alter-
nate technique. In this paper, we explore some alterna-
tives, and evaluate their efficacy by comparing their pre-
dictions to simulations. Our main result is a new formula
which more accurately models storage system reliability.
1 Introduction
The reliability of storage systems is usually a foremost
concern to implementers and users. Data loss events can
be extremely costly, consider for example the value of
data in systems storing financial or medical records. For
this reason, storage systems must be engineered such
that the chance of an irrecoverable data loss is extremely
low, perhaps on the order of one chance in million per
year of operation. These immensely high reliabilities,
however, prohibit real-world testing due to the fact that it
would require a huge number of these systems to be eval-
uated for an extremely long time to empirically measure
with any degree of accuracy. Therefore, implementers
of storage systems must rely on mathematical models
for gauging the reliability of their designs.
It is important that the model used neither over- nor
under-estimate reliability. If the model overestimates
reliability, then the system will be more prone to data
loss than expected. If the model underestimates reli-
ability, the system will be designed with an excessive
level of fault-tolerance and therefore be overly expen-
sive. We evaluated two models used in reliability anal-
ysis, one presented by Chen et al.[2] and another given
by Angus[1]. We found that while the Chen and Angus
methods agree for systems with a fault-tolerance of zero
or one, beyond that, the models diverge by a factorial of
the system’s fault-tolerance.
This paper is organized as follows: In the Background
section, we introduce basic concepts in reliability anal-
ysis and define the meaning of notation used throughout
this paper. Next we introduce two models used in reli-
ability analysis, one presented by Chen et al. which is
commonly used in the analysis of data storage systems
and a more general model presented by Angus for ana-
lyzing the reliability of k-of-n systems. To judge the ap-
plicability of these models we show simulations of how
long systems take to fail and discuss the results. Follow-
ing that, we derive a new model which the simulation
shows to have superior accuracy to both the Chen and
Angus models. Lastly, we mention some areas for fur-
ther improvement to the model we give.
2 Background
The term reliability, as used in this paper, refers to the
probability of correct operation over a given period of
time, where correct operation is defined as the absence
of an irrecoverable data loss. Gibson[5] showed that for
systems with a constant failure rate, the following expo-
nential function may be used to estimate reliability over
time t given the Mean-Time-To-Data-Loss (MTTDL)
of the system: e−t/MTTDL. Knowing this function, the
main difficulty in estimating reliability becomes accu-
rately estimating the system’s MTTDL.
In this analysis, it is important to distinguish between
a data loss and an irrecoverable data loss. Hard drives
and tapes inevitably fail and these are instances of data
loss. However, storage systems are capable of recover-
ing from such failures so long as the number of failures
does not exceed the system’s fault-tolerance. When the
number of failures exceeds a system’s fault-tolerance,
data can no longer be read and therefore lost data can
no longer be recovered.
The rate at which individual components (hard drives,
tapes, etc.) fail is denoted as λ while the rate at which
those components are repaired is µ. Alternatively, these
two rates might instead be expressed as times: Mean-
Time-To-Failure (MTTF ) and Mean-Time-To-Repair
(MTTR) respectively. When λ and µ are constant over
time, meaning exponentially distributed, MTTF = 1λ
and MTTR = 1µ . Throughout this paper MTTF and
MTTR will only be used to refer to the MTTF and
MTTR of components, never the system.
To increase a system’s MTTDL the MTTF of com-
ponents should be as long as possible while the MTTR
should be as short as possible. While implementers of
storage systems can choose the components to use, once
selected, they have little control over the MTTF or
MTTR. MTTF is usually defined by the manufac-
turer of the component and little to nothing can be done
to increase it.
MTTR, on the other hand, may be improved to an
extent. MTTR is the sum of the service time and re-
build time. By using hot spares, the service time may
be reduced to near zero and by prioritizing rebuild I/O
over normal I/O requests, rebuild time may be mini-
mized. For storage devices, however, rebuild time has
an ultimate floor defined by the I/O rate of the device.
Consider that if a 1 TB disk fails, rebuilding it requires
writing 1 TB of data. If the I/O rate of the disk is 100
MB/s it will take a minimum of 2.9 hours to recover.
Given the limited control implementers have over
MTTF and MTTR the most important consideration
for reaching a target MTTDL is choosing an appropri-
ate level of fault-tolerance for the system. The simplest
method for achieving fault-tolerance in a storage system
is by using replication. That is, create some number (n)
of copies of the data and store each copy to a different
component. A replicated data storage system can tol-
erate the failure of n − 1 components, so long as one
copy remains, the failed copies can be remade. In this
respect, implementers have complete control over the
fault-tolerance, and by extension, the reliability of the
systems they create.
Achieving fault-tolerance by making replicated
copies, however, is very inefficient. Other more ad-
vanced methods are known for achieving fault-tolerance,
such as RAID 5, RAID 6, and erasure codes. Unlike
copy-based systems which require 1 of the n compo-
nents to remain operational, these systems require k of
n components to remain operational, where k = n − f
with f being fault-tolerance.
With an accurate model for estimating MTTDL, im-
plementers may engineer systems to meet the reliability
requirements using a minimum level of fault-tolerance.
By minimizing fault-tolerance the storage system will
be more efficient as less redundant information need be
stored or calculated. All reliability models presented in
this paper are capable of estimating MTTDL from the
four metrics: k, n, MTTF and MTTR.
3 Technology Trends and Implications
One might ask, what level of fault-tolerance is sufficient
for any practical purpose? Unfortunately, no answer re-
mains true indefinitely. Consider that as disk capacities
have grown, their performance has not kept pace. This
has resulted in a very large increase in disk repair times.
Whereas it took 57 seconds to read an entire 40 MB
disk in 1991, it takes 3.3 hours on a modern 750 GB
drive[12]. To cope with these longer repair times, sys-
tems have had to increase their level of fault-tolerance.
RAID 5 was sufficient when disks could be rebuilt in
minutes; now RAID 6 is required to keep an acceptable
reliability as rebuilds take hours or days.
Another factor causing the fault-tolerance of storage
systems to increase is the sheer size of storage systems
being built today. The resulting decrease in reliability
as storage capacity increases is linear; with all else be-
ing equal, a system storing 2 PB of data on 2,000 disks
has twice the chance of experiencing data loss as a sys-
tem storing 1 PB on 1,000 disks[2]. Storing more data
inherently carries a higher risk of loss, and with storage
requirements doubling every 24 months[4] the reliability
of all that data is halved every 24 months.
Lastly, disk failures do not always manifest as com-
plete operational failures. Elerath[3] showed that a more
common path to data lass is via latent failures, caused by
improper writes or degradation of the media over time.
Latent failures, more commonly known as Unrecover-
able Read Errors (UREs) result when a drive is unable
to correctly read some sector. The rate at which UREs
manifest is generally reported to be between 10−14 and
10−15 per bit read. This means that even if the URE
rate remains constant, as disk sizes grow the likelihood
of encountering a URE will increase.
Consider a RAID 6 (8+2) array composed of 1 TB
disks. After two disk failures all eight of the remain-
ing disks must be read perfectly without error. With a
URE rate of 10−14, the chance of being able to read this
amount of data without error is given by:
(1− 10−14)8×8,000,000,000,000 = 52.76%
This means that about half the time, the system will
encounter a URE during rebuild and therefore experi-
ence data loss. Even though RAID 6 can supposedly re-
cover from double disk failures, factoring in UREs one
finds that half the time it cannot. Therefore the true re-
liability of this RAID 6 array is only marginally better
than a system with a fault-tolerance of one.
The net result is that when considering increasing disk
capacities, larger storage systems, and the growing risk
of UREs, one may conclude that increasing levels of
fault-tolerance will be required in the future to simply
maintain the same level of reliability. Therefore, it is im-
portant that the reliability model used by storage system
implementers be able to accurately model highly-fault
tolerant systems.
4 Models
4.1 Chen’s Model
Chen et al. presented models for estimating the MTTDL
for various RAID configurations[2], including RAID 0
(no parity), RAID 5 (single parity) and RAID 6 (dual
parity). As founders in the field of RAID, their model
has seen wide adoption by those in the storage industry.
In the paper, zero redundancy RAID 0 systems are said
to have a MTTDL equal to the MTTF of individual disks
divided by the number of disks:
MTTF
n
They further presented models for RAID 5,
MTTF 2
MTTR× n× (n− 1)
and RAID 6 arrays:
MTTF 3
MTTR2 × n× (n− 1)× (n− 2)
A clear pattern emerges in the progression of in-
creased fault-tolerance. Looking at the above formulas,
one sees that the MTTR term is taken to the power of the
fault-tolerance (f ) while the MTTF is taken to the power
of f +1. To account for the multiplication of n∗ (n−1)
... (n − f) we may use the factorial operator to find:
n! ÷ (k − 1)!, recalling that k = n − f . Therefore we
may obtain a generalization of the Chen model which
works for any arbitrary k and n:
MTTF f+1 × (k − 1)!
MTTRf × n!
It is straightforward to see that when f = 0, one ob-
tains the RAID 0 formula. If one sets f = 1 or f = 2,
one derives the RAID 5 or RAID 6 formulas respec-
tively.
4.2 Angus’s Model
J. E. Angus published a paper titled “On computing
MTBF for a k-out-of-n:G repairable system”[1]. His
model is more general than those given by Chen et al.
but nonetheless each may be used to estimate time to
failure for data storage system. There is, however, a dif-
ference between what the Angus and Chen models at-
tempt to calculate. The Chen model calculates MTTDL
which if we stated more generally, is the Mean-Time-To-
First-Failure (MTTFF). This is an important distinction
because after the first failure in a data storage system,
the system cannot be repaired because data is lost. The
Angus model does not assume this, and therefore allows
repair from cases where more than (n− k) devices have
failed. This is why Angus defines the result as Mean-
Time-Between-Failures (MTBF) rather than MTTFF, his
model finds the average amount of time between failures
over an infinite amount of time. In many situations, the
MTTFF will be very close to the MTBF, and in those
cases the Angus model may be used to accurately model
MTTDL. Later in this paper, we will explore the condi-
tions under which this assumption is not valid.
Below is the formula Angus gave in his paper. Note
that this is as it appeared in the original notation, where
he used λ and µ instead of MTTF and MTTR:
1
kλ
(
n
k
)
(λ/µ)n−k
×
n−k∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(λ/µ)i
If we substitue λ and µ with the notation used by
Chen, the Angus formula becomes:
MTTFn−k+1
k
(
n
k
)
MTTRn−k
×
n−k∑
i=0
(
n
i
)(
MTTR
MTTF
)i
Note that for cases when MTTF ≫ MTTR, as is
normally the case for disk drives, the summation com-
ponent of the formula rapidly converges to zero. Given
that for most cases, MTTF will be a time in years and
the MTTR a time in hours, the ratio of MTTFMTTR will be
in the thousands for typical cases and therefore, if iter-
ations beyond i = 0 are ignored, the result will only
deviate by a few thousandths. This level of accuracy
is acceptable for most purposes, and therefore when
MTTF ≫ MTTR one may simplify the Angus for-
mula as:
MTTF
k ∗
(
n
k
) ×
(
MTTF
MTTR
)n−k
This formula looks very similar to the one given by
Chen. Each has MTTF f+1 in the numerator, and
MTTRf in the denominator. Where they differ is in
their treatment of the k and n terms. Chen gives:
(k − 1)!
n!
While Angus gives:
1
k ×
(
n
k
)
By decomposing the
(
n
k
)
term used in the Angus
model one obtains:
(n− k)!× k!
k × n!
=
(n− k)!× (k − 1)!
n!
The only difference between the simplified Angus
model and the Chen model is that there is an extra term
in the numerator of (n−k)!. Therefore the MTTDL pre-
dicted by Chen’s model will be a factorial of the fault-
tolerance times less than the MTTDL predicted by An-
gus’s model. For RAID 0, and RAID 5 systems, 0! and
1! are both 1, so no difference is observed between their
predictions. However, for RAID 6 systems with a fault
tolerance of 2, Chen’s model will yield a MTTDL one
half of what Angus will give.
This difference is arguably minor, but what about for
highly fault-tolerant systems that are now becoming pos-
sible via erasure codes? It was shown in the introduc-
tion that increased levels of fault-tolerance will be re-
quired for very large storage systems. Systems have
already been developed[6, 15, 16] which can support
much higher levels of fault-tolerance. One such system
has a standard configuration of 10-of-16. With a fault
tolerance of 6, the Chen and Angus predictions will dif-
fer by a factor of 6! (720) when estimating this system’s
MTTDL. Why is this so, and which prediction is right?
To see why these models give different predictions, it
helps to look at how the models were derived.
Figure 1: The state transition diagram for the Angus model.
Note that failures occur at a rate equal to the number of op-
erational devices × device failure rate and repairs occur at a
rate equal to the number of failed devices × device repair rate.
Figure 2: The state transition diagram for the Chen model.
While failures occur at a rate equal to the number of opera-
tional devices × device failure rate, repairs occur at the device
repair rate regardless of the number of failed devices.
The Angus model explicitly states the assumption that
there are unlimited repairmen. This means that whether
1 device or 100 fail simultaneously, each failed device
will be repaired at a constant rate. The Chen model,
on the other hand, appears to assume the per-device re-
pair rate is inversely proportional to the number of failed
disks. There is, however, no fundamental reason why
this should be the case, as each drive has its own inde-
pendent I/O resources. If two disks are simultaneously
being rebuilt, the rebuild process may write to both of
the disks at twice the rate it could write to a single failed
disk.
Another possible consideration made in the Chen
model is that because each disk has a fixed repair time,
the first disk to be repaired will necessarily be the first
disk to have failed. The speed at which the first disk is
repaired does not increase according to the number of
failed disks, so why should the repair rate increase? If
anything is clear, it is that these models cannot both be
correct. To attempt to verify the validity of one of these
two models, a Monte Carlo simulation of system failure
time was created.
5 Simulation
The goal of the simulation is to model the failures and re-
pairs of n independent devices until such time that more
than n − k devices are simultaneously in a failed state.
Failures are random and exponentially distributed over
time according to the MTTF. Repairs for each device
take a constant amount of time equal to MTTR, such that
MTTR time after a device’s failure it will be operational.
5.1 Pseudocode
random_ttf()
return MTTF * -ln(random(0,1))
initialize()
fail_times := fail_time[N]
for each fail_time in fail_times:
fail_time := random_ttf()
count_failures(start, end)
count := 0
for each fail_time in fail_times:
if (start <= fail_time <= end):
count := count + 1
return count
simulate_time_to_data_loss()
while True:
nf := min(fail_times)
count := count_failures(nf, nf+MTTR)
if count > N-K:
dl := time of (N-K+1)-th failure
break
nf := nf + MTTR + random_ttf()
return dl
The first method, random ttf() generates a random
failure time for a device given the device MTTF. Be-
cause the simulation assumes failures are exponentially
distributed, the negative of the natural logarithm of a ran-
dom value between 0 and 1 produces a multiplier for the
device MTTF. This function is used by the initialize()
method to assign random failure times to each of the
n devices. What the main simulation loop does is first
check the time of the next failure, then it counts the num-
ber of failures occurring in the range from that failure
time until the time that device is repaired. If the number
of failures exceeds the fault-tolerance of the system, the
loop breaks, and the time of the failure that pushes the
system above its fault-tolerance is returned. Otherwise,
the failure time for the device is advanced by adding the
MTTR and another random time to failure. When the
loop continues, the same process will be run for the next
failing device.
It is important to note that a full run of this simulation
returns only one random time to data loss. To derive an
accurate estimation of the mean time to data loss, this
simulation must be run over many thousands of itera-
tions to find the arithmetic average of all the results. The
average of the results should give a close approximation
of the system’s true MTTDL.
5.2 Simulation Results
We conducted various runs of the simulation, using dif-
ferent values of n, k, MTTF , and MTTR. It was
found that the magnitude of MTTR was immaterial to
the result of the simulation, only the ratio of MTTF
to MTTR is important. Therefore, for each of the re-
sults reported in the tables below, MTTR is assumed to
have a value of 1. Each observed result is the average
of at least 2,000 iterations of the above simulation code.
Note that for the highly fault-tolerant configurations, the
MTTF had to be reduced for the simulation to complete
within a reasonable period of time.
In this table, Predicted refers to the Chen Model:
N K MTTF Predicted Observed O/P
10 10 2000 2.000E2 1.988E2 0.994
10 9 2000 4.444E4 4.488E4 1.010
10 8 1500 4.688E6 9.446E6 2.015
10 7 500 1.240E7 7.786E7 6.278
10 6 200 2.511E6 6.407E7 25.513
Here, Predicted refers to the Angus Model:
N K MTTF Predicted Observed O/P
10 10 2000 2.000E2 1.988E2 0.994
10 9 2000 4.467E4 4.488E4 1.005
10 8 1500 9.438E6 9.446E6 1.001
10 7 500 7.591E7 7.786E7 1.026
10 6 200 6.441E7 6.407E7 0.995
As can be seen in the above results, Chen’s model de-
viates from the expected roughly by a factorial of the
difference between n and k. The Angus method, on
the other hand, reasonably approximates the observed
results for each case, with the simulation results never
deviating more than a few percent from the prediction.
Earlier in this paper, a simplification to the Angus
method was presented which can provide reasonably
accurate results when the ratio between MTTF and
MTTR is very large. Below are the predictions of the
Simplified Angus Model:
N K MTTF Predicted Observed O/P
10 10 2000 2.000E2 1.988E2 0.994
10 9 2000 4.444E4 4.488E4 1.010
10 8 1500 9.375E6 9.446E6 1.008
10 7 500 7.440E7 7.786E7 1.046
10 6 200 6.027E7 6.407E7 1.063
Here one may observe that for cases where the MTTF
is much greater than MTTR, such as with the first few
configurations, the simplified Angus model produces
nearly identical results to the complete Angus model.
However, for the last two cases the deviation is more
pronounced, as the ratio of MTTFMTTR drops to a few hun-
dred. This deviation also manifests in the Chen model,
as the prediction of the Chen model is exactly equal to
the simplified Angus prediction divided by (n−k)!. This
explains why for the last two cases, Chen was off by
slightly more than the factorial of the fault-tolerance.
5.3 Discussion
Given the accuracy of the Angus model compared to the
Chen model, it appears the Angus model was correct to
assume repair transitions in the system occur at a rate
proportional to the number of failed devices. Though
the first disk to fail will be the first to be repaired and the
rate of repair for this first disk does not increase as other
disks fail, it is important to consider how much time is
left for the repair at the time of subsequent disk failures.
Consider a RAID 6 system: after a double-disk-
failure, a third will cause irrecoverable data loss. What
is the expected window of time for the system to remain
in a double-disk-failure state? The Chen model assumes
that the window is MTTR, but for this to be true, both the
first and second disks would had to have failed nearly si-
multaneously. If we consider the average case, however,
the second disk will fail when the first disk is halfway
into its repair. This is because the second failure is a
random event which occurs between 0 and MTTR time
after the first failure. Therefore the true window of time
for the third disk failure will not be MTTR, but MTTR2 .
This can explain why the Chen model underestimates
MTTDL for systems with a fault-tolerance greater than
1. This same property extends to all subsequent fail-
ures: for a system that can tolerate three failures, the
third failure is expected to occur when the first disk is
2/3rds complete with its repair, making the window for
the fourth failure MTTR3 . The assumption the Angus
model makes regarding increasing repair rates is there-
fore accurate in modeling disk failure and repair.
The expected amount of time the system spends in a
state with a single failure is MTTR, the amount of time
spent in a state with two failures is MTTR2 , and so on.
Therefore the repair rate is proportional to the number
of disk failures. Accommodating for these extra factors:
1, 2, 3 ... (n − k) yields the factorial of (n − k)!, since
each factor multiplies the MTTDL.
While Angus performed well for these test cases,
recall that Angus does not calculate the Mean-Time-
To-First-Failure, but rather the Mean-Time-Between-
Failures. It was previously mentioned that these two
values are usually quite close, but this assumption only
holds when there is a high probability that following re-
covery from a failed state the system returns to a fully
operational state before again returning to the failed
state.
When MTTF ≫ MTTR this is true, but when
MTTR approaches, equals or exceeds MTTF , the
MTBF of the the system can be significantly lower than
the MTTFF. To see how Angus performs in these cases,
simulations were run using much smaller MTTFMTTR ratios.
For these tests, a constant n = 10, k = 6 were used the
results of 100,000 iterations were averaged to get the ob-
served MTTDL. Below are the results obtained through
the Angus model:
MTTF MTTR Predicted Observed O/P
20 1 4136.67 4423.75 1.07
10 1 205.63 234.28 1.14
1 1 0.31 0.67 2.18
1 10 0.18 0.65 3.66
1 20 0.17 0.65 3.77
As expected, the Angus model consistently underesti-
mates MTTDL. This is because the MTBF over an infi-
nite amount of time will always be less than the MTTFF
which is calculated by starting at the perfect state where
all devices are operational. When calculating the MTBF,
it is not assumed that the system returns to a perfect state
following failure.
To address this limitation of the Angus model in esti-
mating MTTDL, a new model was derived with the as-
sumption that there are no returns from the failure state,
thus defining a system where the first failure is the only
failure.
6 Proposed Model
It was found that more accurate predictions could be ob-
tained using the following formula:
1
n
n−k∑
i=0
MTTF i+1
MTTRi
n−k−i∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(
n−1
j+i
) (1)
This formula and its explanation were produced and
graciously offered by Yura Volvovskiy on the authors’
behalf, reporting that it is a straightforward exercise in
the theory of Markov chains and Poisson processes to
show that the expected time to failure is given by this
formula.
The Markov model used to derive this formula is iden-
tical to the one taken from the Angus paper except the
rate of exit from the system failure state is zero. In a
state with i disks down there are two Poisson processes.
One moves the system to the state i + 1 when an addi-
tional disk fails. It has intensity (n − i) × λ. The other
brings the system to the state i − 1 when a disk is re-
paired. Its intensity is i× µ.
The total intensity at any state i is therefore (n− i)×
λ+(i×µ). The time spent in any given state is therefore
1
(n−i)×λ+(i×µ) . Let us denote Ti as the expected time to
reach the failure state starting from state i. Ti will be the
sum of time spent in state i plus the expected time to get
to the failure state from i−1 and i+1, multiplied by the
respective probabilities of each transition.
The final equation is therefore:
Ti =
1
(n− i)× λ+ (i× µ)
+
(n− i)× λ
(n− i)× λ+ (i× µ)
× Ti+1
+
(i× µ)
(n− i)× λ+ (i× µ)
× Ti−1
This provides a system of linear equations that if
solved for T0 produces the result (1). When this model
was used to generate predictions for the same configu-
rations where the Angus model deviated, the following
results were obtained:
MTTF MTTR Predicted Observed O/P
20 1 4491.17 4423.75 0.98
10 1 246.26 234.28 0.95
1 1 0.89 0.67 0.75
1 10 0.66 0.65 0.97
1 20 0.66 0.65 0.99
Therefore we find that this model yields results which
are much closer to those of the simulation. In the in-
stances where the Angus model was off by a factor of
3.77, this model was within 1%. One may wonder how
common it is for the MTTFMTTR ratio to be so low. Paˆris and
Long presented a method for predicting reliability in the
face of batch-correlated failures[7]. In it, they suggest
that to model the manifestation of a batch-correlated fail-
ure, one should reduce the MTTF of disks in the sys-
tem to something much lower than it would be normally,
suggesting a time between one week and one month
might be reasonable. In such a case, the MTTFMTTR ratio
could be as low as 3.5. Another reason to expect the ra-
tio to drop is that in the past 15 years, the time it takes
to read an entire hard drive has increased by over 200
times. This means the lower bound on rebuild time, and
therefore the minimum MTTR has likewise increased by
this amount. A similar decrease over the next 15 years
would see the ratio drop from the thousands to around
10 to 20.
7 Simplification and Equivalency
With MTTF ≫ MTTR this new formula may be
simplified by keeping only the biggest contributors to
the summation. The biggest contributor occurs for i =
n− k. Evaluating only this case, the formula reduces to:
1
n
×
MTTF i+1
MTTRi
×
(
n
0
)
(
n−1
n−k
)
Through some simple transformations this formula
may be reweritten as:
1
k
×
1(
n
k
) × MTTF i+1
MTTRi
Which is identical to the simplified Angus model.
Therefore when these two models are expected to pro-
duce very similar results when MTTF ≫MTTR, be-
cause in that case the less significant contributors to the
summation converge rapidly.
8 Conclusions
We have demonstrated that a common model for esti-
mating MTTDL due to disk failures grossly underes-
timates the true MTTDL for systems that have a high
degree of fault-tolerance. Furthermore, we showed that
a model presented by Angus provides accurate estima-
tions of MTTDL for systems with a high degree of fault-
tolerance so long as MTTF ≫MTTR.
While the Angus model is more complicated than the
one presented by Chen et al., a simplified version of An-
gus can be used which deviates by only a few percent for
reasonable MTTFMTTR ratios. For more less constrained sit-
uations, we presented a model derived through Markov
theory which exhibits a high degree of accuracy for cases
of small MTTFMTTR ratios and showed the common relation-
ship (1) holds with the Angus model.
Our main result is that while the Chen model is ad-
equate for systems with a fault tolerance of 0 or 1, it
should not be used for systems with a fault-tolerance
beyond that. Therefore to accurately model RAID 6,
Triple- (or higher) Replication, or erasure code systems,
the Angus formula, or its simplified version ought to be
used. When modeling a system whose MTTFMTTR ratio is
less than a few hundred, one should use the model (1)
presented in this paper over the Angus method.
9 Future Work
There is much room for further investigating and im-
provement to the method presented in this paper. Some
candidates for further research include: modeling of cor-
related failures, using non-exponentially distributed fail-
ures for system components, and investigating the true
likelihood of Unrecoverable Read Errors in light of our
findings.
9.1 Correlated Failures
The models presented in this paper all assume failures
are statistically independent events, but much research
has been done to refute this assumption in practice[13].
In the paper by Chen et al., a simple method for mod-
eling correlated disk failures was presented[2]. What
their model prescribed was to assume the MTTF for the
second disk failure was 1/10th what it was for the first
failure, and further assume that every subsequent disk
failure is 10 times more likely than the last.
This provides reasonable results for a RAID 5 or
RAID 6 system which can only tolerate one or two fail-
ures. For RAID 6, at worst the third disk failure will
only be 100 times more likely to fail than the first. How-
ever, consider a system that could tolerate 5 disk fail-
ures. The 6th disk failure would be modeled to have
a MTTF 1/10,000th what it would be normally. If the
MTTF
MTTR ratio is less than 10,000, adding increasing lev-
els of fault-tolerance actually decreases the MTTDL pre-
dicted through this method.
While it is usually better to underestimate MTTDL
than overestimate it, clearly this method reaches a break-
ing point if adding additional fault-tolerance causes the
estimated MTTDL to decrease rather than increase. To
blindly follow this method’s predictions, one would
design a system that is less reliable than what he or
she might otherwise choose. Therefore, developing a
method for modeling correlated failures in highly fault-
tolerant systems would be quite beneficial.
9.2 Exponentially Distributed Failures
The models in this paper assume constant failure rates
over time for the underlying components. Gibson and
Schroeder showed that in practice, disk failure rates fol-
low a bathtub curve[13] with higher levels of failure
initially, stabilization during normal operating life, and
slowly increasing with age.
They further found that the Weibull distribution could
be used to provide a reasonable approximation of fail-
ure rates of hard drives over their useful lives. It re-
mains an open question how our reliability model might
be amended to accommodate for hard drives with a non-
exponentially distributed failure rate.
9.3 URE Rates
Our conjecture for why the Chen method was off for
higher levels of fault-tolerance was that it fails to ac-
count for progress made in the rebuild of the first disk
to have failed. This consideration should also alter the
expectation of encountering a URE. Since on average,
the first (f − 1)/f portion of the disks will have already
been read in rebuilding the first failed disk by the time
the system experiences f failures.
A URE causing irrecoverable data loss, however, must
happen on the part of the disks that remains to be read to
rebuild the first failed disk. Therefore, this consideration
should reduce the expected likelihood of a URE causing
irecoverable data loss. Exploring exactly how the esti-
mated MTTDL is affected remains to be explored, but
we expected it to have a non-negligible effect for sys-
tems with a high degree of fault-tolerance.
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